Beside of all its synergy, reduction in exchange costs and worldwide
prestige there are reasons for which euro skeptics deny the introduction of the
Euro, or frankly saying its substitution with their local currencies. They
argue the loss of national sovereignty through the centralization of monetary
control, the alienation of governments from exchange rate benefits, the
mono-objective program of the ECB, the costs of common monetary policy and other
defaults that Maastricht Plan is imposing.
For centuries, the currencies of European economies meant more than
exchange tools. Their forms, sizes and colors were symbolizing nationalities of
their origin and their holders trusted in the words their issuers for its worth
against the gold and other currencies. Since their initial usages, the paper
banknotes have gained symbolic values together with their monetary worth.
Nationalist policies of the politicians have been joined to the currencies. The
figures of the national leaders, monuments, and victories were put on the
currencies as sources of nationalism. Therefore giving up national currencies
and introduction of a new and international one was hard to welcome from this nationalist
point of view.
On the other hand, the money printing and the control on its worth
are also estranged from national governments. Other than historical usage and
emotions, the fluctuation of the exchange rates is an economic maneuver that
Euro countries are not free as they used to be before the EMU. The value of the
Euro, interest rates and the money supply is determined by the ECB, which is
above of all national institutions and free from their control. We will observe
the ECB, but we should now focus very briefly on the loss of the exchange rate
policies.
Without the exchange rate policy making, economies lost their
devaluation and interest rate tools that were securing their competitiveness in
the international market. Deciding on the value of their currency, they had an
extensive sovereignty on their agents’ purchasing and selling capacity. With
the Euro system, even though they need the devaluation of the Euro to compete
with other regional giants of the world, many European economies faces the
burden that the ECB do not compensate.
In terms of the alienated sovereignty, the ECB is the most important
novelty that EMU introduced. Nevertheless, the ECB has more to analyze, such as
its independence, its bureaucracy, its unique purpose of price stability.
The ECB, which is an assembly of national central banks in an
independent and supranational form, has been located in Frankfurt ,
the financial capital of Germany .
It is independent from governments’ control and trustful in terms its loyalty
to its constitution. It is governed by appointed bureaucrats and an executive
committee and is closely connected to Brussels .
The rule of the entire European monetary economy by a group of non-elected
bureaucrats intensifies the dose of euro-skepticism (Giordano, 1998; 71-72).
Especially when we think on the current world economy and the role of the
financial measure on our welfare, the reduced role for elected politicians is a
paradox that European democracies are suffering. The lack of public responsiveness
and accountability make democrats more sensitive and reactionary against the
Euro.
On the other hand, in the constitution of the ECB, the main concern
of the institution is stated as the protection of the price stability. Out of
this overriding objective, other issues can be followed but they are doomed to
remain secondary. Through the non-inflation figures, the ECB determined its
target as a tolerated inflation in the range of 0-2 % (Giordano, 1998; 69). It
is a fact that a responsible central bank in an economy must be sensible also
for other issues such as economic growth, employment and balance of payments.
Yet the ECB lacks or postpone such concerns.
For all monetary unions the main problem is the determination of the
Optimum Currency Area (OCA), it is because the non-accordance among members of
the union can cause the disharmonies in the policy determination. As a
consequence, there would be lower potential of Pareto superior conditions. This
is true not only for international monetary unions but also for national
unities. Economic agents can be located in different parts of the business
cycle, to mean in shrinking, expanding, or stagnant slopes. Then, the
appropriate interest rate, money supply and fiscal political choices alter for
those agents to cold or to heat the overall economy.
In the EMU barriers, according to the Maastricht Criteria, the
monetary tools for balancing the economies are estranged from national
institutions. The only option that remains for them is to play with their
fiscal tools, but this option is too limited with the criteria as the budget
deficit and total debts of governments are limited with strict points.
The disharmony in the business cycle is something that European
economies are currently suffering. To illustrate with an example, in the early
days of the EMU, the Scottish and German economy were in quite opposite
directions. The Scottish economy was over-heated due to a high growth in a very
short term. The economy must be calmed down and the conventional tools for this
purpose are increasing the interest rates, reducing the money supply in the
market or fiscally increasing taxes, reducing government expenditures and
reducing subsidies. Among these, monetary tools were estranged and only via
fiscal tools the management of the Scottish economy can calm down the economy.
On the other side, the German economy was suffering from non-cyclical recession
that is articulated mostly after the re-unification costs and increased welfare
burdens over the government spending. The unemployment reached intolerable
levels and the economy was shrinking due to competitive disadvantages. The
solution was the practice of the right opposite tools that we listed for the
Scottish economy. Out of monetary tools, the fiscal measures that Germany could
apply were blocked with Maastricht Criteria. The fiscal discipline cannot be
ceased; the government spending, debt levels and subsidies were all limited
with existing criteria. After all, the policy making of the ECB was crucial for
both economies and their incompatible demands would be dissatisfied.
Furthermore, as we have seen hitherto the EMU system is crisis prone; there
remains something to do when economy is expanding but whenever a recession
occurs, EMU is not immune to revitalize the needy economy.
These points are not the entire threats of the Maastricht Treaty and
EMU is composing. The sanctions that treaty offers are in forms of monetary
penalties, in other words, a poor performance economy is punished with a bill
when it is in recession that would make it even worse. The disciplinary aspect
of the union is hardly to be defended to be rational in this respect.
We analyzed the costs of the Euro and we mentioned about the loss of
national sovereignty on monetary and then fiscal measures of the member
economies; the business cycle problems that endanger the harmony of the member
economies. These all threats can never be thought without the general framework
of the world economy on the one hand, and the main political concerns of the
EU, on the other.
In the existing world economic paradigms, without any monetary
integration, there is still reduced sovereignty on the monetary issues as
foreigners in quite open economies mostly determine the value of a national
currency. The money inflows and outflows determine the welfare of a country
rather than elected politicians. Furthermore, due to complex interdependency in
the world economy, regional crisis, such as the East-Asian, Latin and Russian
crisis of the last decade, affect the entire world economy. The sovereignty and
determinacy by the elected politicians is an obsolete issue. The parities of
the currencies are determined not on the political round tables, but on the PC
monitors of the individual economic agents. Therefore such criticisms targeting
the overall sovereignty issues and the centralized monetary control are nothing
but nostalgic exaggerations.
On the other hand, in terms of business cycles that member economies
will suffer from common policy making by a highly centralized central bank, or
disabling governments to operate in their economic zone are not a relevant
criticism. It is a fact that the EMU system and the Euro should not be
considered apart from political concerns. The political gains from such
unionization are not our subject but it should be considered that such
motivations are prone to encourage politicians to suffer these risks.
Moreover, again for this issue, is that all such disciplinary
measures and sanctions are expected to limit the populist expenditures that
democracies suffer as well as the efficiency concerns that European politicians
are now aware. There are harder rules for the new game, and fortunately the
players are keen to play it at any cost, if there really exist any.